The correspondence principle

It has been pointed out to us that the concepts of "experience" and "consciousness" previously mentioned were a bit hazy. Let's elaborate a bit on them so that the underlying structure may become more apparent. For that we must first clear up what the present mainstream picture is and what its problems are.

So far, we have streered away from the term 'subjective experience' for reasons which will become obvious later, but that is what we refer to when we write 'experience'. The commonly accepted view is that there is a conscious subject which perceives objects and has thereby an experience of them. The subject can be a person or an organism who owns a nervous system. Additionally, neuroscientists have uncovered physical processes happening in the brain which are in a one-to-one correspondence with our subjective experience. Nevertheless, conceptually, there is a difference between the subjective perception and the underlying physiological phenomenon. Take, for example, a given cell in a monkey's cortex and show the monkey various objects. You notice that whenever the monkey is shown a banana, that neuron fires at a high rate. Sometimes it also fires less rapidly when he is shown a yellow elongated shape but clearly the brain cell responds to the perception of a banana. The monkey is subjectively experiencing a banana, but the corresponding physical process is the firing of specific brain cells.

Unfortunately, this is where the present day clear picture ends. From here on now we have a confusing and often conflictuous wilderness of philosophical definitions. Because of this equivalence between two seemingly so different things -- one the stimulation of a gooey cell, the other one the delicious and colorful perception of a banana --  people have introduced the definition of qualia. A qualia is the subjective experience of a physical object, the mental rendering or illustration if you will of an otherwise blunt thing. Things which can perform this rendering are said to be conscious whereas the rest of the stuff has no experience of the world, of any kind. 

Within it is deeply rooted the idea of a subject and an object separate from each other. And because of that, one may very well wonder if two people render the same object in the same way. When you and I look at a leaf, do we both render the color green in the same way? This leads us inevitably to picture the universe as a redundant fan of many paralel universes, as many as there are observers, each one coloring the world in its own randomly chosen way. In our view this picture is wrong in two ways.

First, it states there is a one-to-one correspondence between subjective experiences and physical phenomena, but only for stuff that is similar to us. It artificially imposes that the only possible subjective experiences are the ones we humans experience, such as thoughts, emotions and so on. As Pocahontas would put it: "You think the only people who are people are the people who look and think like you." This human-centered distinction between what is conscious and what isn't then allows people to draw the line wherever pleases them, according to whichever criterium of similarity appeals to them the best, like the presence of a well developed nervous system or the deliciousness of its meat. Some will include all mammals, others all the animals all the way to the oysters, and others will even accept that artificial intelligence may one day become conscious. Confronted with this chaos the most sensible will generally take an agnostic stance, dismissing the question as unanswerable. Yet to them, in their own personal case, that question, of whether they are themselves conscious, is obviously answerable.

In our view the origin of this immense confusion is the distinction between conscious things and unconscious ones. If you remove it everything works again. It means everything has some kind of experience, but that experience varies from system to system. The only constraint is that it be in a one-to-one correspondence with the underlying physical phenomena.

Of course, you might now protest by saying: "What about when I'm asleep? In a deep sleep I'm clearly not conscious." Sure. It kind of is the very definition of being unconscious, lying down still with your eyes closed, asleep or dead. However, is it accurate to say you were unconscious? All you can say is that you have no recollection of anything, that you are unaware of what may or may not have happened during the night, the same way an amnesiac is unaware of what he did previously, even though no one in their right mind would claim he was previously unconscious. This doesn't mean you were thinking about work or humming your favorite song in your head while you were asleep; what went on during the night might have been extremely different from what you experience during the day and it definitely didn't leave any trace you can access. But all you can say is that you awake and you asleep are not mutually conscious.

Which brings us to the second problem we see in the mainstream picture. It assumes there is an observer who perceives and an object which is perceived. This picture is a purely theoretical one and a very wrong one when you look at the system in detail (that's why we didn't want to use the term subjective experience). Yes, the monkey is looking at a banana and experiencing it, but what's really going on is that the atoms on the surface of the banana are interacting with the cone cells on the monkey's retina through light, which then interact with the braincells of the visual cortex through chemical reactions, and so on, and so on. Is there really a distinction between the banana and the monkey? Not in this view. There are changes in the type of interaction that mediates the event of perception but no fundamental change. What you can say is that the cortex of the monkey is aware of the banana, but not that the monkey is aware in general. There is no absolute consciousness, no things that are conscious and things that aren't, there is only relative consciousness, things that are aware of each other and things that aren't. Interaction is consciousness. This doesn't however mean it goes both ways. The visual and motor parts of the brain of the monkey are aware of the banana but the banana isn't aware of the monkey nor is the liver of the monkey aware of the banana, though the ecosystem of bacteria in the fruit might be aware of the ape through the chemicals that emanate from it.

These two principles, formulated by getting rid of any human-centered artificiality, by not thinking in terms of what is conscious and what isn't, have allowed us to ponder about the consciousness of different phenomena without running into self contradictions or infinite loops and at the same time have openened a vast new area of scientific exploration: the study of the mind of physical systems. We will soon address some specific examples and techniques on how to go about doing this.

The basic principles

It is a principle by which we live every day that there are conscious things and that there are things that are just things. Many people wonder what it might be like to be a dog, but except for a few self concerned vegetarians, few question themselves about the experience a tree has, let alone a molecule or a web of genetic exchanges. However, it has not always been so.

In a time when nature was a major part of a human being's existence, natural phenomena were considered conscious. But as man moved away from nature and integrated larger and larger communities of other people, it ceased to ponder strongly about anything beside other humans, and natural phenomena lost their place among living things.

The height of this scission happened in the west during the Hellenic period around 500 B.C., when in certain societies not even women were deemed capable of thought and decision making. It was then that concepts such as soul became philosophically popular and, by extension, the concept of things that didn't have one. Things that can't experience existence, that can't hear, see or feel, things that can't think or conceive, suffer or rejoice; things that are just props in an otherwise bright and colourful universe to those who have the gift of sentience and choice: Men.

This period also witnessed the very early beginnings of modern science, a movement which throughout its succeeding centuries aimed and succeeded at relating the human's rational mind with it's surrounding environment. And as men related rationally more and more with other organisms, women, barbarians, africans and new-world indians rejoined the western pantheon of sentient beings, then apes and mammals and, nowadays, with the rise of neuroscience, anything with a nervous system. That's why some will go to the extent of eating tofu.

Neuroscience has uncovered that most and potentially all human experiences can be associated with a particular physical phenomenon, located in the brain. As there is little evidence suggesting otherwise, the rest of our discussion will be based upon the assumption that all experience can be traced back to some physical phenomenon. However, our first principle goes beyond that. Since there is a direct link from human experience to physical phenomena and there is nothing cosmically special about the brain, we also postulate that:

Every physical phenomenon has an experience associated with it which is consistent with its dynamics.

 Of course, the experience is only an expression of the phenomenon, so we're not claiming apples hate Mondays and love pizza. The phenomena within the apple, or which the apple participates in, have some experience associated to them in a one-to-one correspondence with their dynamics.

However, one might wonder why aren't we all conscious of everything then, since we're all just a big soup of consciousness. The answer is, of course, that the processes happening in my brain have little to do with the processes in the brains of others. Therefore the degree of mutual consciousness is very low. Brains are mutually conscious in the appropriate way consistent with physical observation: they have an experience of each other through light (vision), sound (speech), chemical compounds (smell) and so on. A collection of agents will likely be unaware of the personal experience of its constituents in the same way we generally are unaware of the particular dealings of each of our individual brain cells. Which leads us to our second postulate:

Processes can only be said to be mutually aware of each other. There is no absolute consciousness.

This means we shouldn't ask ourselves what is conscious and what isn't. We can only say whether two things are aware of each other. This strongly goes against our intuition towards identity, but let's not forget that identity is only itself a phenomenon, one of our many experiences linkable to activity in certain areas of the brain and sometimes even to firing of certain specific brain cells. Children at an early age have no concept of self. It is a structure which develops later likely out of the social necessity to distinguish one's needs from others'.

The last principle means that the more processes interact the more complex the experience is, because a great number of processes are mutually aware. That is why complex systems such as ourselves experience an immense inter-webbed myriad of phenomena. The study of the experience of other systems is the purpose of this blog: what ingredients of our own experience are universal? Which other unexpected phenomena share similar experiences with us? Can a given system suffer? Throughout this blog we will explore this new incredible world and step off this lonely course of existence mankind has set for itself -- of carrying the burden of being the only ones aware -- into a vast living universe.